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Executive Summary
Patents vary substantially in the degree of protection providedagainst unau-
thorized imitation. In this chapter we explorea range of work addressing
the economic and policy implications of "weak"patentspatents that have
a significant probability of being overturned or being circumvented relatively
easilyon innovation and disclosure incentives, antitrust policy,and organiza-
tional incentives and entrepreneurial activity
Weak patents cause firms to rely more heavilyon secrecy. Thus, the competi-
tive environment is characterized by private information aboutthe extent of
the innovator's know-how. In suchan environment weak patents increase the
likelihood of imitation and infringement, reduce theamount of knowledge
publicly disclosed, and potentially reduce the incentivesto innovate.
The discussion also highlights some implications of weakpatents for antitrust
policy. Weak patent rights increase the likelthood ofpatent litigation over com-
mercially valuable patents and raise the specter of anticompetitivesettlements.
Encouraging the antitrust agencies to refersome patents for re-examination by
the patent office would facilitate investigation ofpotentially anticompetitive IP
settlements.
Finally, we note some implications for weak property rightsin settings involv-
ing employee-inventors and employee misuse of confidentialinformation. In
the former case an increase in the strength of legalproperty rights such as pat-
ents reduces the employer's ability to prevent employees departingwith valu-
able know-how, in part because a strongerproperty right increases the value
of the employee's start-up option. In the lattercase, an increase in legal pen-
alties for breach of confidentiality has the expected effectof decreasing such
occurrences.2 Anton, Greene, and Yao
I.Introduction
All patents are not created equal. They varysubstantially in the degree
of protection provided against unauthorizedimitation. Thus, patent
strengthor the lack thereofis a major concernfor innovators and
imitators alike. Patents may lack strengthfor a number of reasons,
including that they have a significant probabilityof being overturned
or they are relatively easy tocircumvent. We refer to patents with such
characteristics as "weak," though this categoryalso includes patents of
middling strength.
Intellectual property policy discussions often adopt aperspective
on patents that implicitly assumesthe characteristics associated with
strong patents. But research suggeststhat this starting point may be
unjustified and potentially misleading because theeconomic and pol-
icy implications of weak patents frequentlydiffer from those of strong
patents. For example, weak patents causefirms to rely more heavily
on secrecy, which, in turn, creates anenvironment in which competing
firms lack economically important informationabout the capabilities of
their competitors.
This chapter explores the economic and policyimplications of weak
patents. We begin by exploring the significanceof weak patent rights
in the presence of private information. Theremaining sections then
discuss the implications of weak patent rightsand private information
on innovation and disclosureincentives, antitrust policy, and organiza-
tional incentives and entrepreneurial activity
II.The Strategic and Policy Implications of WeakIntellectual
Property and Private Information
Weak patent rights and private information interactand, therefore, are
best considered together. We briefly discusseach factor in turn and then
consider their interaction.
The Ubiquity of Weak Patent Rights
Considerable evidence suggests that for a wide arrayof technologies
(and hence industries) patent protection is not strong.This section
reviews some of the evidence regarding variationsin the strength of
patent protection.Policy Implications of Weak Patent Rights 3
Evidence of Weak Patents. A substantial proportion ofpatents
granted in the United States are at risk for being invalidatedor nar-
rowed. Determining the precise percentage of such dubiouspatents
is difficult, but studies of patent overturn ratesare suggestive on this
count.' Along these lines, Allison and Lemley (1998) found thatamong
patents challenged on validity grounds, about 46 percent of litigated
patents were overturned between 1989 and 1996. Prior to the creation
of the Federal Circuit in 1982 this percentagewas closer to 65 percent.
Insufficiency of examination resources is an important contributorto
the patent quality that results in such reversal rates.2
Under the U.S. patent system careful examination of allpatent appli-
cations would be extremely costly. Because the vast majority ofpatents
have little or no ultimate economic value,a close examination of all
patent applications arguably wastes resources (see,e.g., Lemley 1990).
Patents that have economic value and that are legally questionableare
natural targets for litigation by competitorsor other affected parties.
Litigation focuses intense scrutiny on precisely those patents thatmat-
ter. Many consider patents as "licenses to sue" and it is through the
litigation process that the true strength ofa particular patent emerges.
In addition to legal soundness, patent strength also dependson the
ability to exclude economically "close" substitute technologies. If sucha
circumventing technology results in a product that has comparableper-
formance and cost characteristicsas a product embodying the patented
technology, then the private economic value of the patent is lessened.
The Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2001)surveys of intellec-
tual property appropriability provide evidence suggesting that (1)the
strength of property rights varies significantly by types of invention
(or industry) and (2) in a large number of industries, tradesecrecy
is as important, or more important, than patents for appropriating
the rents to invention. An earlier study by Mansfield,Schwartz, and
Wagner (1981) examined 48 innovations (of which approximately70
percent were patented) and found that about 60 percentwere imitated
within four years. This finding also suggests that thepatents were not
strong enough to deter infringement or avoid close circumvention.
Uncertain Patents. Many patents may also be perceivedas weak
when issued, in part because they involve issues of firstimpression.
Later, some of these patents may be viewedas strong. In technical fields
that involve a new class of technology, considerable uncertaintymay4 Anton, Greene, and Yao
exist regarding patent scope, or even theavailability of protection at
all. It was initially unclear, for example, whether agenetically altered
living organism could be patented and some patents inbiotechnology
have been criticized as overexpansive, while others seem toconflict
with existing patents. Business methods, which hadhistorically been
hard to patent, have found new life viaState Street.3
The Ubiquity of Private Information
Because knowledge is easy to expropriate once it isknown, firms typi-
cally attempt to keep their innovative know-how secret.Firms, there-
fore, frequently make critical investment and pricingdecisions without
knowledge of other firms' decisions and with quite limitedknowledge
of what others already have discovered. Sometimesfirms may even be
unable to identify whether others are working on the sameproblems.
A partial picture of the broader knowledge portfolioof a competi-
tor can be gleaned from the competitor's patentportfolio (Rivette and
Kline 2000). While such competitor scanning isof significant value
and may suggest the overall foci of a competitor'sresearch efforts, it
constitutes only a lower bound on the competitors'actual knowledge.
Moreover, even if all inventions were patented, patentknow-how dis-
closures typically lag patent applications by 18 months or more.
Competitors may also rely on trade secret protectionrather than on
patent protection, especially when a prospective patentis likely to be
weak. In those cases not only is the know-how private,the extent of
the competitor's know-how may be private as well. Anexample of this
double level of secrecy is the "walking out" process thatIntel discov-
ered in the early 1970s that allowed it to achieve highyields in the pro-
duction of EPROM circuits. This process left no trace inthe product
itself and could not be reverse engineered. Further, ifIntel wished to
keep the yield secret, it could have done so (Jackson1997).
On the other hand, when a firm chooses to patent, itis forced to dis-
close technical know-how. As we discuss later, the patent mayalso sig-
nal the extent of the firm's total knowledge (patentedknowledge and
knowledge held secret).
Strength of Patent Right versus Extent of Private Information
The cost of disclosing knowledge through a patentdepends on the
strength of patent rights and the extent of privateinformation. A strongPolicy Implications of Weak Patent Rights 5
patent is very likely to be upheld if challenged, gives thepatent-holder
a broad scope of protection (circumvention is difficult), and depthof
protection against infringement. While the importanceof validity and
scope is self-evident, the depth of protection against infringement
deserves some comment. Illegal expropriation ofknowledge from a
patent may be difficult to detect, especially if theuse of the underly-
ing knowledge is not visible in the commercial productembodying the
invention. (One firm only learned that its tradesecret had been stolen
by another firm after it had acquired the otherfirm!)4 MoreOver, even
if detection is easy, it is unclear whether theamount of the infringe-
ment damages is sufficient to deter infringement in the firstplace. In
the United States, the two primary methods used forawarding dam-
ages are determination of lost profits and determination of reasonable
royalties. As we discuss below, both methodscan be ineffective deter-
rents to infringement.5
When patents are not strong, a firm ismore likely to rely on trade
secrets or some combination of patents andsecrecy. This is perhaps one
reason why Cohen et al. (2001) found that in most industries firms rated
secrecy equal to or above patent protection as a means of appropriating
profits. Thus, a defining characteristic of settings involvingsecrecy is
that private information existsover both the extent of the knowledge
held and the actual knowledge. Issues relatingto private information,
therefore, assume increased importance.
The costs and benefits of secrecy dependon several considerations.
How effective is secrecy for protecting the innovativeknowledge of the
firm? Are competitors aware of the extent of the firm'sknowledge? Will
disclosed knowledge increase the probabilitythat a competitor will
invent the next-generation product?6
Secrecy cannot protect those innovations wherethe invention is
disclosed through the product itself. In suchcases, even weak patent
protection is preferable to no protection at all. Patents alsopreempt oth-
ers from acquiring a patent on the knowledge thata firm could have,
instead, held secret. In the U.S., inventors who employsecrecy expose
themselves to being excluded by subsequentpatenting of their inven-
tions by others. In Europe such subsequent patentingposes fewer prob-
lems as the Europeans allow the first inventorto continue to use the
invention.
Table 1.1 examines how various combinations ofsecrecy effectiveness
and patent strength lead tO different economic choices.The dimensions
in the table represent the expected situation facing theinnovating firm6 Anton, Greene, and Yao
prior to its choice of protection mechanism.For example, patent strength
is the expectation of the firm as to howwell patents will protect its
intellectual property should the firm choose to patent.Secrecy effective-
ness represents the firm'sexpectation about how much knowledge that
is initially private will become known toothers once the product or
service embodying the invention is sold onthe market, i.e., via direct
observation or reverse engineering of theproduct or service itself. The
measure does not accountfor disclosures made through patenting or
publishing. The secrecy effectiveness dimensionseparates inventions
into three general categories: naked ideainventions, black box inventions,
and unobserved inventions. Each categoryof invention may be associ-
ated with strong or weak property rights.
A naked idea invention is one where thecritical invention is easily
observable in the product or service that embodiesthat invention. With-
out strong patent protection, nakedidea inventions can be imitated eas-
ily. In some cases afirst-mover advantage may accrue to the innovator.
In other cases rents will be earned bythose who are best able to exploit
the idea (e.g., firms that control relevantcomplementary assets such as
strong marketing or distributioncapabilities). And in still other cases,
all rents will be competed away.
A black box invention is an invention for whichthe added performance
is obvious when the product or serviceis observed, but the meansthe
magic ingredientsby which the performanceis achieved cannot be
readily discerned or reverse engineered.Software often has many of
these features (e.g., Windows operatingsystem).
Many inventions will have combinationsof these characteristics. For
example, a new configuration of lenses in atelescope eyepiece can be
easily observed once the product is availablein the market and could
not be kept secret short of notselling the product in the first place. How-
ever, the lenses of the neweyepiece result in an observable performance
improvement but may be ground using ahidden and novel method.
A third category of invention is theunobserved invention. This cat-
egory includes, for example, processinventions that allow a previously
offered product to be manufactured for agreatly-reduced cost. Com-
petitors may not even know that there is aninnovation, though they
might suspect it if the innovator's price were tochange significantly.
Such inventions can be kept secret, butbeing completely secret might
sacrifice some strategic advantage that mightresult if rivals knew that
the innovator had substantially lower costs.Policy Implications of Weak Patent Rights 7
Because the relevant know-how for strategiccompetition purposes
includes knowledge about follow-on innovation, inmany naked idea
inventions some element of private informationmay still exist. Then
the private information shifts from the basis for thecurrent invention
to knowledge the inventor has that allows for thesecond generation
product. That private information affects the likelyproduct lifetime of
the current product and will, therefore, also affectpricing and promo-
tion decisions.
Table 1.1 also illun-iinates how a firm mightchoose its protec-
tion strategy given expectations about theinvention's characteristics
regarding patent strength andsecrecy effectiveness. The decision to
patent or keep know-how partiallyor completely secret has implica-
tions for a firm's assessment of its competitors'innovation positions
Table 1.1
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which then affect investment, pricing, and entryOftentimes, it will
benefit the knowledge-holder to signal its advantageousposition to its
competitors (while avoiding fully disclosing theunderlying know-how
responsible for this advantageous position). Thus,the firm with private
information may signal its position to competitors.
III.Implications for Innovation Incentives
If firms cannot appropriate the value oftheir innovation, they wifi have
a limited incentive toinvest in innovation. Legal intellectual property
rights such as patents are designed in part to ensurethat inventors
appropriate the value of their inventions.Generally, weak property
rights reduce the prize available to a patentholder. Within a specific
context, however, the impact of weak propertyrights depends in part
on whether theintellectual property in question can be protected by
other means and the incentives of theinnovator's competitors to use
the innovator's know-how.
Zero Property Rights Does Not Equal ZeroAppropriation: Protection
by Other Means
At the extreme, weak property rightsapproach no property rights, a
characteristic typifying early-stage conceptionsof many creative ideas.
But the absence of property rights does notexclude appropriation. For
example, an inventor without property rights canstill appropriate rents
even when she must fullyreveal the know-how of the invention to sell
ittca firm.
In Anton and Yao (1994), full revelationby an inventor to a buyer
prior to a contract still results in a significantpayoff for the inventor.
The reason is that revelation creates a credible"blackmail threat."7 By
revealing the invention, the seller removes thebuyer's initial skepti-
cism about the value of the previously unseeninvention, but now faces
the possibility that the now-informed buyer canfreely expropriate the
invention when there are no property rights.This is, of course, the clas-
sic market for ideas problem Arrowidentified (1962). The buyer, how-
ever, has a strong incentive to preserveits information monopoly and
prevent the seller from going elsewhere.This incentive leads the buyer
to offer a contract that providesincentives to the seller not to sell the
idea to a third party. The absence of propertyrights then becomes a
two-edged sword and the buyer must pay an (expected)amount thatPolicy Implications of Weak Patent Rights 9
is on the order of duopoly profits to eliminategains-to-trade between
the inventor and a potential second buyer. Thus,even with no prop-
erty rights, the payoff to innovation investmentscan be significant. The
key element is that private information effectivelyconfers an economic
property right on an innovator and this information, advantagecan be
leveraged into a significant payoff relative to themarket value of the
invention. In turn, policy assessments ofproperty rights should récog-
nize that innovation incentivesare not necessarily forced to zero by the
absence of formal property rights.8
Further, not all firms that haveaccess to an invention are similarly
situated with regard to the development and subsequentcommercial-
ization of the invention. Inmany cases, a firm with nonexclusive access
to an invention can appropriate the invention's value becauseof control
of complementary assets suchas superior marketing or manufacturing
capabilities. (See, e.g., Teece 1986). Anand and Galetovic(2004) discuss
numerous other means through which innovatorscan appropriate rents
even in settings with limited property right protection.
The Impact of Weak Property Rightson Imitation and Infringement
If a firm anticipates that its invention will have onlyweak intellectual
property protection, holding other factors constant, it isarguably less
likely to invest in such innovation in the firstplace. The actual impact
of weak IP protection, however, ultimately dependson the economic
choices made by the innovator and its competitors.
Innovator and Imitator Choices.Consider first some choicesan
innovator may make given weak property rights. With theexception of
naked idea inventions, the innovator always hasthe option of protec-
tion via secrecy. This option establishesa lower bound on the payoff
available to an innovator. Under weakproperty rights the innovator
would disclose its invention to getsome modest probability of legal
protection against direct imitators. Tradesecrets provide no legal pro-
tection (except via contract) and need not result indisclosure beyond
that which is unavoidable through productinspection. In fact, reliance
on trade secrets opens up the innovator to infringementquestions
should a competitor invent and patent. Becauseinnovations are rarely
composed of a monolithic piece of knowledge,a combination of patent-
ing and secrecy is common. An innovatormay also preempt imitation
by licensing the weakly protected inventionto imminent competitors.10 Anton, Greene, and Yao
An innovation choice regarding thebalance of patent and trade
secret protection depends on anticipatingwhat the competitors would
do, which depends, in part, on thecompetitor's perceptions of how
much innovative knowledge the innovator possesses.For example,
how much a potential licensee would bewilling to pay for a license
depends on what know-how it receivesand what additional know-
how the licensor retains for the licensor's ownadvantage.9 Weak patent
rights may induce an innovator to hold someof its know-how secret,
thereby leaving the potential licensee with nodirect way of learning
the full extent of the innovator'sknowledge. This critical information
asymmetry potentially interfereswith the valuation calculation that
underlies a licensing negotiation or, alternatively, acost assessment that
impacts competition absent a license.
The message with respect to imitatorchoice is that in settings with
private information (e.g., where secrecyis employed) the innovator
will often have an incentive to signal itsstrength on a dimension rel-
evant to either innovative or productmarket competition. For example,
if the innovator's signals persuade an imitatorthat the innovator has
a significant cost advantage,the imitator will be less aggressive in the
ensuing product market competition.
Innovation Investment: Failure Has ItsReward Too.Consider the
implications of weak property rights and privateinformation for inno-
vation investment decisions when two or morefirms are competitors
in innovation, e.g., racing for the patent.Under strong patents, the
incentives for firms to invest are strong asthe competitors vie for the
"monopoly" position.'° But in the case of weak patents,the reward
associated with winning and the "costs"attendant to losing the race
are moderated. Thereduction in the cost of losing reflects the factthat
the loser under weak patents can moreeasily circumvent the patentee's
invention. This "reward" to failure is aforce which decreases the incen-
tive for investment by decreasing therelative difference in competitive
positions before and after the innovation race.
Even when a patent provides legal protectionagainst expropriation
of innovative knowledge, strategic infringementactions can reduce the
expected costs of infringement under patentdamage niles commonly
used in the United States. Consider, forinstance, a process innovation
within the context of a market competitionbetween two firms. This
situation provides the infringer with anopportunity to manipulate
the resulting legal damage award via marketchoices. One form thisPolicy Implications of Weak Patent Rights
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opportunity can take is "passive infringement,"which occurs when the
infringer takes all of their gains fromthe process innovation via internal
cost reduction with no changes inmarket behavior. Even when policy
is oriented toward protecting theprofit of the innovator, as with the lost
profits damage award (restoring theinnovator 's profits to the level that
would have been earned absentinfringement), innovation incentives
will be reduced. Passive infringement,by construction, leaves the profit
outcome of the innovator unaffected andso the reward to an innova-
tion success is not reduced. However,the reward to an innovation fail-
ure is greater (as infringement is profitable)and so each firm has less
incentive to invest in R&D.12
The analysis of weak property rightsin the presence of private irifor-
mation leads to several results. First,weak patent rights are not fatalto
innovation incentives. Second, weakpatent rights increase the level of
private information. Both of these resultsaffect the strategic interactions
between the innovator and itscompetitors. The reliance on patenting
versus trade secrecy becomes affected by thestrategic value associated
with appearing "tough" andsmaller technical advancesare economi-
cally better protected than largeradvances under weak patent rights.
Finally, the incentives foran imitator to risk infringement are increased
by the availability of infringementchoices that take advantage of the
methods by which the courtsassess infringement damages. Insum,
an increased incentive to infringe generallycorresponds to decreased
incentives for innovation.
IV.Implications for Disclosure Incentives
(i.e., Patents versus Trade Secrets)
In addition to encouraging innovation,another critical purpose of the
patent system is to encourage know-howdisclosures. Weak patents
prompt innovating firms to relymore heavily on secrecy, which, in
turn, reduces the amount of knowledgepublicly disclosed. Note that if
product inspection orreverse-engineering reliably yielded all relevant
information, then the policy benefitfrom patent disclosure would be
diminished (if not eliminated).
Reliance on secrecy increases theimportance of the private informa-
tion held by the innovator for bothsubsequent innovation competi-
tion and product marketcompetition. Consider, for example,a process
innovation setting correspondingto the case of an unobserved invention
under weak patent rights (see table1.1) in which greater innovativeAnton, Greene, and Yao
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know-how translates into lower costs.Recall that an unobserved inven-
tion refers to an invention inwhich both the extent of know-howand
the actual know-how are privateknowledge of the innovator. In the
case of productmarket competition, a firm wifibe less aggressive if
it thinks that the otherfirm has lower costs. Becausethe actual cost
(through innovation) of the firm isunknown to its competitor, the value
of appearing to have low costs creates anincentive for firms to take
actions to persuade theircompetitors that they have low costs.A pri-
mary meansthrough which this can be done is todisclose a portion of
one's know-how developedthrough investment in innovation.
The economic rationale fordisclosure incentives hinges on acost!
benefit comparison. The cost ofdisclosing commercially valuableinfor-
mation, whether through patents,research papers, conferences, or other
public methods of dissemination, isthat market rivals may be able to
improve their own capabilities.The benefit derives from the assessment
rivals will make about the trueunderlying capabifity of thedisclosing
firm. This is the familiar notionof market competition in a strategicsub-
stitutes settinga firm wouldprefer that a rival believe it has a strong
capability (such as low costs)rather than a weak capability because
this leads the rival to adopt aless aggressive market position(such as
reducing output or abstainingfrom making entry investments).Partial
disclosure has the desirablefeature of preserving at least someof the
advantage for oneself whileproviding convincing know-howevidence
for rivals that innovative progresshas, in fact, occurred.
The economic forces drivingdisclosure choices by innovatorsand
reactions of rivals typically lead to anoutcome in which an inventing
firm is able to appropriate ahigher proportion of the value ofsmall
versus large inventions.That is, firms with more modestinventions are
often led to make full disclosuresbecause the benefit margin swamps
the cost margin while those withgreater advances rely moreheavily on
secrecy. Firms with greateradvances seek to separatethemselves via
disclosure from those with lesseradvances and this creates an incentive
to make larger disclosures.However, larger disclosurestransfer more
valuable information to a rival andlead to less appropriation of value
by the innovating firm.
The economic incentive for disclosurewith this sort of process inno-
vation is based on the ideathat "I would like you to know thatI have
low costs but I do not want you toknow howl do it." Figure 1.1provides
a graph of theresulting relationship betweendisclosure and innovation
that can arise in equilibrium1with a convex shape being thetypicalPolicy Implications of Weak Patent Rights 13
outcome (see Anton and Yao2003,2004).Small innovations, whichmean
high costs in the case ofprocess innovation, are often fully revealed.
With larger innovations, meaning lowercosts, disclosure is partial and
the firm resorts to secrecy toa greater extent (convex shape).
To interpret the structure underlying thegraph, imagine that the
highest cost level, c, correspondsto a patent for a new product witha
minimal specification of how itcan be produced (point A in figure 1.1).
Lower values for c correspond to betterprocess innovation outcomes
regarding the product and the disclosure levelscorrespond to disclo-
sures about the know-how involved. The inventing firmcan obtain the
patent with a minimal disclosureor it can choose to include additional
claims (or even separate patent applications).The disclosure curve then
shows how, in equilibrium,a firm with privately observed cost c will
choose to disclose. As a rough guide, theincentive structure is that any
disclosure associated witha small innovation (costs close to cH) forces
an innovator with a more significant innovationto make a larger dis-
closure as they seek to convince rivals thatthey are, in fact, stronger
competitors in the market.
At point B in figure 1.1 we have thesituation of an innovator with
a significant advance. The true extent ofprocess innovation is given
by the production coston the horizontal axis. The disclosure of this
firm regarding its innovation isat the vertical level corresponding to
point B. As this point lies above the450line, secrecy is being employed.
Since the cost level ofCH corresponds to a minimal know-how specifi-
cation, the vertical distance fromCH to point B measures the extent to
which disclosure allows a rival to reducecosts. The vertical distance
from point B to the45°line then measures the cost advantage thefirm
has chosen to maintain, viasecrecy, relative to rival firms. Note thatas
we move to the left in figure 1.1 and consider firms thathave innovated
to a greater extent, both of the verticalgaps increase but the reliance on
secrecy is more extensive.
Figure 1.1 exhibits two different disclosurecurves, corresponding to
whether patent rights are strongor weak. The parameter 7 is an index
for the strength of patent rights, suchas the probability of invalidity
or compensation via legal damages for infringement. Aspatent rights
become perfect and ygoes to 1, we are pushed to the45°line: when
the risk of competitoruse vanishes, an innovating firm reveals the
full extent of innovation. Asy falls the disclosure graph shifts up and
secrecy is employed more often. The limiting position whenpatent
rights vanish is not, however,a horizontal line at height CH at which allAnton, Greene, and lao
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information beyond a minimal level iswithheld. Instead, the limiting
position when patent rights vanish is onewhere the tradeoff between
signaling and technology transfer to arival is still operative and
the disclosure curve lies betweenthe extremes of minimal and full
disclosure.
An important observation for policyfollows from this last point: an
absence of formal patent rights does nottranslate into complete secrecy.
As with our above discussion where weargued that rent appropriation
and innovation incentives are stillpossible in the absence of property
rights, we see that firms will stillhave an incentive to make public dis-
closures about their innovations. Tothe extent that social benefits of
disclosure underlie the right to excludeothers via a patent (and the cre-
ation of monopoly power), it is importantto recognize that the bench-
mark position is not one of complete secrecy.
Depending on the degree of invention (i.e.,reduction of costs), the
relative cost of disclosing usabletechnical know-how changes. Firms
with smaller inventive steps face lower costsof revealing this techni-
cal know-how for two reasons. First,the cost to infringing is dispro-
portionately greater than the benefitswhen infringement involves
small inventions. Second, if anotherfirm has invested in innovation
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in cost reduction. Then, the fulldisclosure of the smaller inventionis
not so harmful as the competitor is likelyto "know" that invention
already. This implies that the (marginal)cost of disclosure vanishes at
CH whereas the (marginal) benefit is still positive. Consequently,a firm
with a modest invention willdisclose fully as the benefitswamps the
cost. In both of these cases, however, firmswith more significant inven-
tions will face a positive costmargin and the tradeoffcomes back into
play, leading to only partial disclosure.
For a specific context,suppose legal damages for infringement take
the form of "reasonable royalties"and that the competitor must decide
between staying witha prior generation technology (cost ofcH) and
risking a court finding of infringementby using the disclosed infor-
mation of the patenting firm. Forany disclosure near CH, the firms are
almost symmetric in the marketcompetition and the sizeable market
share of the rival impliesa large expected royalty damage. Staying with
the safe technology is better and becauseof this, the patenting firm will
fully disclose in thisrange.
Another interesting implication for IFpolicy is that partial disclo-
sure by the innovator and infringement bya rival go hand-in-hand in
equilibrium. That is, the situationsin which the inventor choosesto
rely on secrecy, at least in part,are also the situations in which the rival
will find it profitable to infringe thepatent right. Intuitively, if a partial
disclosure could deter infringementthen it would be advantageousfor
the weaker innovator to mimicthe disclosure (which is feasiblesince it
is a partial disclosure). In thesecases, the increased market competition
provides a cap of sortson monopoly distortions in the market.
V.Implications for Competition andAntitrust Policy
Antitrust authorities consider theimplications of patentson competi-
tion in many contexts ranging fromproposed mergers to the conduct of
standard-setting organizations.13 Oneimportant concern has been with
potentially anticompetitive settlementsof patent litigation. The resolu-
tion of litigation through settlementis typically efficient and should
be encouraged. Insome cases, however, the settlementprocess can be
hijacked for anticompetitivepurposes. The existence of weak patent
rights complicates the analysisof whether a particular patent dispute
settlement constitutesan antitrust violation.
Patent litigation typically focusesupon whether the patents at issue
are valid and/or infringed. Forease of explication, this section willAnton, Greene, and Yao
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focus on validity issues ratherthan the related issue of infringement.
A primary reason patents areinvalidated is that previous patents or
publications anticipate theteachings of the patent and, therefore,the
claimed invention is not"nonobvious." Patent litigation istypically
expensive and unpredictable.Not surprisingly, litigantsfrequently set-
tle thir disputes prior to ajudicial ruling on validity Suchsettlements
include a wide variety of elements,including, for example, monetary
payments, licensing, and/oragreements to discontinue thealleged
infringing use.
Antitrust law recognizes that avalid patent grants exclusivityof
use to thepatent-holder. Therefore, manyagreements between
horizontally-related parties that wouldnormally constitute law vio-
lations are permitted when theagreement involves a valid patent.
Whether a patent is valid ornoteffectively a crude assessment of pat-
ent strengthmaydetermine the range of permissibleagreements.
Consider the following example: Apatent holder sues an alleged
infringer who counter-claimsthat the patent is invalid. A settlement
is reached wherein thealleged infringer receives favorablelicensing
terms. To what extent is orshould society's estimation of thesettlement
reflect the strength of the underlyingpatent? If the patent is strong, the
patent holder is entitled tothe market power that thepatent's exclu-
sivity conveys.14 Part andparcel of that is the considerableleeway the
patent holder enjoys as it pertains tolicensing. Stated alternatively, the
patent holder as "monopolist"is permitted to reach a settlementthat
creates a duopoly involvingthe patent-hokIer and the allegedinfringer.
A comparable outcome given aweak patent would, however, be
potentially anticompetitive, if, forexample, the result would be prices
that are higher than whatwould have resulted had the patentbeen
invalidated.'5
Perhaps the most important partof this example is that which is.
assumed. Distinguishing patents accordingto strength can be extremely
difficult. This is particularly truewhenthe information needed for such
an assessment isprivate and divulgence of thatinformation is not in the
interests of those who hold it.Consequently, weak patent rights may
increase opportunities foranticompetitive conduct while, atthe same
time, may decrease the easewith which such. conduct can bedetected
and stopped.
How can or should the antitrustagencies address patent strength
when they assess the competitive impactof a patent settlement? Numer-
ous mechanisms havebeen proposed to facilitate treatmentof dubiousPolicy Implications of Weak PatentRights 17
patents in antitrust cases. Some proposalsfacilitate direct evaluation of
patent strength. For example, the antitrustagencies themselves could
request PTO re-examination of competitivelysignificant patents. The
FTC took this approach at leastonce in the past and has expresseda
renewed interest in it (FTC Report 2003).
The antitrust agencies could, in theory,evaluate patent strength
themselves, though the institutionalchallenges attendant to suchan
undertaking are numerous. Asa threshold matter, there is the prob-
lem of expertise andresources. Evaluating patent validity issues isan
extremely resource-intensiveenterprise. Further, government chal-
lenges to settlementsencounter the additional obstacle that theanti-
trust defendants (the parties to whatwould have been the underlying
patent dispute) are most likely to have thebest information regarding
patent strength as well as an "oftenstrong incentive to submergeor
conceal pertinent information.. ." (Bowman 1973, p. 242).16
In addition to those practical issues,there is arguably a more funda-
mental question concerning theproper scope of an antitrust agency's
institutional role. Should theagency be engaged in such determina-
tions or should the determinationsbe left to the PTO and thecourts?
Given these constraints,at least one proposal has advocatedthat
the antitrust agenciesengage in a limited, but direct,assessment of
patent strength.'7 Another set of proposalstakes a less direct approach
and involves agency evaluation of"objective indicators of patent valid-
ity." That is to say, "antitrustregulators could attempt to identifyprox-
ies for patent validityobjectivecriteria or behavioral conditions that
make economic sense only if thepatent rights are invalid." The most
common indicator or "red flag" includespayments from the patentee
to the challenger or "reverse payments."(O'Rourke and Brodley 2003,
p. 1784.)
VI.Implications for Organizational Incentivesand
Entrepreneurial Activity
Weak property rights and privateinformation also affect intra and inter-
organizational structure and relationshipdecisions. In this section,we
take the perspective that inknowledge-based industries,an important
perspective on understanding organizationalstructure is to view struc-
ture as a knowledge-management choice.(See, e.g., Teece and Ches-
brough 1996, Rajan and Zingales1998, and Demski et al., 1999). From
this perspective some choicesregarding organizational structureareAnton, Greene, and Yao
18
best understood as"remedying" undesired knowledge flows across
division and firm boundaries.
We briefly discuss howorganizational and relationship decisions
affct (1) potential conflictof interest problems within a firmthat
provides multiple products orservices and (2) incentives to create
and exploit inventions and to moveintellectual property across firm
boundaries.
Organization Structure and Conflictsof Interest
Proprietary information learnedduring the course of transactions
between firms frequently hasvalue in other unauthorized uses.
For example, a consultingfirm that learns one client's future mar-
keting strategy might find thatinformation valuable in consulting
with another client. While theconfidentiality of client information is
legally protected, under somecircumstances that information maybe
strategically leaked to advantageorif the same people are involved
with both clients, it may beimpossible to "forget" the other client's
information.
While legal protections aretypically available to deter breachesof
confidentiality, it is difficult to discoverand then effectively stop knowl-
edge leakage. Thus, in manycircumstances, confidentialityagreements
may confer only"weak" property rights to theprotected knowledge.
Demski et al. (1999) examined thisabuse of confidential information
problem and the impact oforganizational and ownership structure on
the amount of abuse. In theirmodel an employee of a (consulting)firm
has an incentive to misuse aclient's proprietary informationand the
client (e.g., a consultingclient) cannot monitor the misuse.Misuse is
anticipated by the client and is reflected in alower fee. The firm's choice
of an employee incentive structuremoderates but does not generally
eliminate an employee's incentive tomisuse proprietary information.
High-powered (strongly performance-based)incentives for employees
increase the extent to whichproprietary information is(mis)used by
employees, so firms that need toreduce misuse of inforiiation decou-
ple performance from pay. Firms mayalso find it valuable to make
observable investments by erecting"Chinese walls" to increase the
costs of information flow(e.g., the firms can locate twodivisions in dif-
ferent physical locations), therebyincreasing information security and,
hence, client fees. As a matterof public policy, the firm alsobenefits
from increased legal liability forproprietary information. This liabilityPolicy Implications of Weak Patent Rights 19
assures the client that the firm has incentivesto structure its organiza-
tion and incentive choices to improveinformation security.
Conflicts of interest alsoappear in transactions involvingan upstream
firm, e.g., a satellite manufacturerthat must rely on an integrated
downstream firm, e.g.,a launch vehicle supplier, which alsoowns a
rival to the upstream firm. Theupstream firm frequently must share
proprietary information with the downstreamfirm to achieve appro-
priate coordination efficiencies. But thedownstream firm may find it in
its self-interest to divulgesome of this proprietary information with its
upstream subsidiary, thereby potentiallybiasing the upstreamcompe-
tition in favor of the integrated firm.'8
Creation and Exploitation of Inventions:Ownership, Control, and the
Movement of Ideas and Inventionsacross Firm Boundaries
Within a firm, inventionsmay be either the creations of an individualor
a team of individuals. This situation is thesource of many potential dif-
ficulties. Consider thecase of an individual that discoversan important
insight into an invention while workingin the firm, but the knowledge
is prepatent or is unpatentable.She could disclose this insightto the
firm (after all she isan employee of the firm), but she mightworry that
once the firm has the information it willnot reward her. Alternatively,
she can take advantage of the relativelyliberal U.S. employment law
and either take the idea elsewhereor leave and develop the idea in her
own start-up.
An employee's knowledge is privateinformation pending disclosure.
Weak property rights exist in thissetting in three ways. First,no formal
property rights (e.g., patents)are established over the invention insight.
Second, if the employerowns the property right, it may still be dif-
ficult for the employer to effectivelyenforce it (i.e., firm can't establish
that the employee learned the ideaprior to departure).'9 Third, while
the employee would normallyown the property right, say because the
insight was developed after hours,the employer might still be ableto
exploit the knowledge under thepenumbra of its rights as employer,
claiming the key conception occurredduring company time and with
company resources.
A number of recent courtcases highlight the tension between inven-
tor-employees and their employers. Oneprominent case involves Shuji
Nakamura who in 1990 receiveda $150 bonus from his employer,
Nichia, after revealing his blue lightLED invention. In subsequentAnton, Greene, and Yao
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litigation, Nakamura arguedthat the company did not supporthis
research, which he pursuedprimarily after hours. In 1999, a Japanese
court awarded Nakamura$100 million in damages.2° Courtdocuments
indicate Nichia reported $1.15billion in profits in 2004 on thesale of
products based on Nakamura'sinvention.21
Returning to the individualemployee-inventor example, rather than
leaving, the employee couldreveal the concept to the firm andseek
to bargain forpayment.22 Disclosure weakens thebargaining position
of the employee because oncethe concept is disclosed, theemployer
can develop thisconcept without further compensatingthe employee,
though it may then have to competewith a start-up begun by the ex-
employee. By remaining silentand departing, however, theemployee
can pursue a start-upwhich will encounter less competitionfrom the
former employer, who lacks theinformation to compete. In these set-
tings, the departure option isoften more attractive, even whenin-house
development generates a largerprivate joint reward.n
Numerous public policy levers canalter the outcome of this employee-
employer relationship. One set oflevers involves changing thestrength
of the underlying patent and/ortrade secret property rights. Asecond
set of levers involves thebreadth of rights given to thoseassociated
with the invention.24
In the employer-employeerelationship, the existence of private
information can lead to propertyrights remaining economicallyweak
for the employer notwithstandingpolicy shifts toward a strongerlegal
property right regime. If theinvention can receive strong patent protec-
tion, then the outside reward tothe employee from remainingsilent
and leaving the firm to form a start-upwill likely increase. Similarly,
stronger trade secretprotection can be expected to improvethe bar-
gaining position of the employer,provided that the employer is aware
of the invention. Consequently,the incentive of the employee toremain
silent (rather than reveal theinvention to the employer) anddepart may
increase since the prospectof a reward from the firm isdiminished.
Therefore, because private informationimpacts the ability to acquire
and enforce property rights, the netimpact of stronger legal protection
may be a weakereconomic property right for theemployer.
A similar counterintuitiVeeffect can arise when legal "shoprights"
govern the relationshipbetween the firm and employee.Shop rights
allow the employer freenonexclusive use of an employee'sinvention
when that invention was createdusing the employer's resources.If thePolicy Implications of Weak Patent Rights 21
firm learns of an invention, for instance afterthe employee departs to
form a start-up, then it may be able toexercise shop rights over that
invention. This implies a weaker effectiveproperty right for the depart-
ing employee/inventor anda smaller start-up reward. In these cases
the weaker property right translates intoan increased likelihood that
the firm and employee will be able tocontract successfully and develop
the invention jointly.
VII.Conclusion
Weak patents have strong implications forcompetitive behavior. By
inducing more use of secrecy to protect innovation,weak patents cause
key economic decisions to be made underconditions of private infor-
mation. Private information is especially salient forsettings involving
black box or unobserved inventions.
Private information considerations affect choicesof how to protect
inventions and the possibility and nature of infringement.Weak pat-
ents increase the likelihood of imitation and infringementand increase
the use of secrecy. This, in turn, affects innovationinvestment, poten-
tially reducing the gain from beinga winner in a patent race and the
amount of knowledge that becomes publicly disclosed.
Changes in judicial determinations of damagescan increase incen-
tives to innovate. Under the current system, firmstrategies to minimize
damages while gaining net advantages from infringingmake infringe-
ment more likely and reduce the general incentivesto innovate. The
inclusion of some level of profit disgorgement from theinfringer (but
not necessarily to the patent holder) would discouragesuch infringe-
ment strategies.
Our discussion also highlightssome implications of weak patents for
antitrust policy. Weak patent rights increase thelikelihood of patent
litigation over commercially valuablepatents. Such litigation raises,
however, the specter of anticompetitivesettlements. Greater oversight
by the antitrust agencies in thearea of intellectual property settlements
would arguably help rein in such behavior.Current antitrust efforts,
however, are hampered by a lack of patentexpertise and possible politi-
cal resistance to an expansion of the antitrustagencies' role into patent
assessments. Encouraging the antitrust agencies to refersome patents
for re-examination by the patent office wouldfacilitate agency investi-
gation of potentially anticompetitive settlements.22 Anton, Greene, and Yao
Weak property rights result not only fromlimited scope of legal
protection but also from the difficultiesassociated with discovering
unauthorized use of intellectual property. Two importantsettings where
discovery is difficult are breaches ofconfidentiality and loss of intellec-
tual property through employee departure.In the former case, increas-
ing judicial penalties for breach ofconfidentiality would induce firms
to adopt more secure incentiveschemes and/or to make more invest-
ments in information security. In thelatter case, however, an increase
in the strength of legal propertyrights wifi not necessarily reduce the
loss of intellectual property throughemployee departure. Increases in
strength have the direct effect of reducingthe loss of intellectual prop-
erty that the employer knowsabout, but this effect can be offset because
stronger legal property rights also encouragethe employee to keep
more inventions secretfrom the employer in anticipation of leaving to
launch a start-up.
Endnotes
Two problems with determining the percentageof dubious patents are that validity
challenges are less likely when a patent is obviously strongand, conversely, many ques-
tionable patents may be licensed rather thanlitigated. Also, patents that are not invali-
dated but are narrowed will not necessarily count asbeing overturned. See, e.g., Jaffe and
Lerner (2004) for an extended discussion ofsuch issues and other estimates of reversal
percentages.
The degree to which patent applications faceexamination scrutiny varies from coun-
try to country Kingston (1984) notedthat some countries have issued patents with very
little examination (e.g., South Africa) while othershave examined patent applications
with considerably more scrutiny (e.g., Germany).
State Street Bank and Trust Company v. SignatureFinancial Corp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
Northern Petrochemicals Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d1057 (7th Cir. 1973).
One problem is that the damages do not accountfor the probabifity that an infringe-
ment is not discovered.
See generally, Scotchmer and Green (1990),Gaflini (1992), and Bessen and Maskin
(2000).
A second reason, developed in Anton and Yao(2002), derives from the option of par-
tial revelation by the inventor. By disclosingonly a portion of the intellectual property
a seller can induce potentialbuyers to bid via contract offers to attract the sellerand
acquire the remaining portion. In these settings, it isthe prospect of acquiring additional
IF (versus denying it to a rival) that provides aninnovation reward when there are no
property rights.Policy Implications of Weak Patent Rights 23
The no-property rights setting may reflectcomplete absence of property rightsor a setting in which the transaction is contemplatedprior to when property rights can be
obtained.
For example, BASF has licenseda previous generation process for making the chemi-
cal phthalic anhydride while using itsown later-generation process (Foster 1986).
For this discussion, we are assumingno market power in the preinvention status quo.
See Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and the subsequentliterature on dominant firms and the
persistence of monopoly.
This discussion is based on Anton and Yao (2005).
Circumvention does not merely mean thata firm can imitate, it also makes it easier
for the firm to make better use of whateverknowledge it developed through -itsown innovation investment.
See, e.g., Tom and Gillman (2003) who listmore than a dozen nonmerger cases in
which patent uncertainty has arisen in antitrustcases before the U.S. courts or antitrust
agencies.
That is, the market power dependson how much competition exists from noninfring-
ing substitutes.
See, e.g., Shapiro (1985), (2003) and Choi (1998).There are also examples, of course,
in which the antitrust bonafidesare sufficiently clear that the outcome would remain the
same regardless of any clarification of patent strength.
Evidentiary standards present another obstacleto antitrust cases involving patents.
Under the law patents are presumed valid.Those challenging the patent must demon-
strate based on "clear and convincing evidence" that thepatent should not have issued.
This high standard is imposed despite the fact thatwhen the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) evaluates a patent application, it detern-dneswhether to issue the patent basedon
the lower "preponderance of the evidence"standard. Arguably, this escalation of patent
strength, a practice that has been soundly criticizedby many including the FTC, contrib-
utes to the ability of owners of weak patents togame the system (FTC Report 2003).
The government would consider whether theplaintiff's "ex ante likelihood ofpre-
vailing in its infringement lawsuit is significant"Hovenkamp et al. (2003). "This over-
sight necessarily requires some inquiry into themerits of the IP suit, but we think it need
not be particularly searching." Id. But see O'Rourkeand Brodley (2003) for a discussion
of what "significant" means as a practicalmatter.
See "Martin Marietta to 'Build Wall' BetweenSateffite and Launch-Vehicle Divisions
to Settle FTC Charges over General Dynamics Acquisition,"Federal Trade Commission
Press Release March 25, 1994. This general class ofproblem has been analyzed by Hughes
and Kao (2001).
It is difficult for an employer to wina suit against an employee who has departed
with an idea when the arguably misappropriatedidea was in a formative stage andpos-
sibly was not even known to the firm. See,e.g., Merges (1999). Almeida and Kogut's
(1999) analysis of the knowledge flow in thesemiconductor industry finds that employee
mobility is a important influenceon the local transfer of knowledge between firms.
This award was subsequently reduced ina later settlement to a reported $8 million
which was still a precedent-setting settlementin Japan for an employee-inventor.Anton, Greene, and Yao
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Managing Intellectual Property, March 2004, P.1.
This discussion is based on Anton and Yao(1995).
See Aghion and Tirole (1994) for ananalysis of how ownership and control of prop-
erty rights affects innovation effortand innovation investment under strongproperty
rights.
A third set of levers involves allowingthe firm more freedom to write employee con-
tracts that restrict employee mobility.
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